

## A. STAATS – PSYCHOLOGICAL BEHAVIORISM –

UP TO 1950 (1)	<p><b>NOTE:</b> This behaviorism did not figure before 1950 because his principal protagonist, Arthur Staats entered in psychology in the early 50's. It was first called Social Behaviorism and currently it is also called Psychological Behaviorism.</p>
1951 TO 1965 (1)	<p>In the book <i>Complex human behavior</i> (1963), it is clear that observation is the basic form of knowledge acquisition, and observation can be naturalistic or controlled in the precision of the laboratory. We can know functional relations, which permit prediction and also control. These relations constitute scientific statements if they are based on reliable observations – based on Stevens, observations must be public and repeatable. Scientific Knowledge is different and progress through improved observations (experience). Language behavior as mediator in cognitive activities and in emotional conditioning (in terms of classic and operant principles). Psychology studies human behavior – all the activities from thinking to muscle and glandular responses, but to deal with complex behavior can be made up of chains of responses (once formed, can be independent of environmental stimuli), including implicit responses (proprioceptive stimuli, thinking) that are considered intervening variables</p>
1966 TO 1981 (1)	<p>In 1968, Staats wrote that knowledge of events can be expressed in common language statements and progress to theory. No need to reject traditional psychological terms – define them in behavioral terms. In 1975, Staats published his book <i>Social Behaviorism: a third generation unified theory</i>. Instrumental conditioning as interrelated – procedures of CC to modify instrumental responding. Language functions like theory from the person to relate events.</p>
1982 TO 1997 (1)	<p>Humans are able to know what they have done in the past and that is important to guide later actions. Knowledge provided by systematic methods will produce progressive improvement in whatever area of study, and the goodness of that knowledge will depend on the nature of the worldly events studied (1983). One important obstacle to improve knowledge and to unify and integrate theories is competitiveness between people who produce knowledge – antagonistic theorists. Three areas of knowledge – phenomenological, biological, behavioristic can be incorporated in heuristic relationship. For Staats, understanding emotional responding is central to understand human behavior. Emotion/ behavior relationship is strongly learned and it is accounted for XXXXXXXX (emotional) value of</p>

<p>1951 TO 1965 (4)</p>	<p>In 1959, Kantor offers interbehavioral foundation to avoid traditional epistemology, which was not centered in the development of theories about actual events, but in questions about certainty and reality. Science is a particular form of interbehavior and all the interactions lie on an interbehavioral continuum, but with especial goals: the nature and operation of events. To be scientific, knowledge must be derived from interbehavior with events in the interbehavioral field; constructs must depend on interbehavioral factors in the psychological domain, but scientist must scrutinize and verify his operations to increase understanding and control (that constitutes the <i>precision</i> the science). Scientific propositions must be descriptive and explanatory (in terms of measuring and calculations). Kantor defines two valid postulational systems: Inductive law construction and comprehensive field systems, where propositions are integrated with a metasytem (system matrix). Coherence and congruence are essential for the validity of a system. And criteria of validity has to do with foundations: assumptions and presuppositions.</p>
<p>1996 TO 1981 (4)</p>	<p>To be scientific, postulates are products of organized and interpreted data must be congruent with operations (Kantor, 1968). Propositions must retain primary features of actual event-fields and can be examined by philosophy of science respect to their origin (contact with events, not with verbal tradition) and validity (1968, 1969). Major concern: paradigmatic structure of psychology as a science. Scientific psychology does not differentiate between sensing and perceiving, does not regard confrontation of individuals with their environing objects and persons as the creation of those stimulus objects. Responses to objects are accounted for exclusively by contingencies occurring during confrontations of organisms with particular objects. With the emphasis on this confrontations, scientific psychology does not need surrogation of mind or consciousness by a brain or nervous system (1969)</p>
<p>1982 TO 1998 (4)</p>	<p>In 1983, Kantor considered that scientific psychology within a system is an interdisciplinary set of operations and functions. For Ruben (1984), ITB psychology is a <i>scientific hypothesis</i> that affords psychology a more pragmatic system, a transactional one. This system has to do with methodological expansion: multiple response and interacting response patterns – concurrent and sequential response patterns. Adds the broad area of scientific systematics – examine the logic of science to improve knowledge development. Following INTB fundamentals is enough to maximize valid knowledge, with the assistance of effective resources. INTB will no longer be necessary when psychology incorporates its offerings.</p>

	Must be handled with reference to its entire unit. Scientific knowledge has developed through stages and has reached to complicate symbols and formulae, sometime remote to the original events or situations to which they refer. This knowledge can be wrong when descriptions are made in terms different than measured and calculated ones. Related to types of scientific interbehavior, Kantor describes five, depending on the interest: Inquiry concerning the existence of the event, investigation into the nature of events, interbehavior with operations, inquiry of specific interrelations, and interbehavior with relations. As a scientist, psychologist attempts to organize and evaluate his interbehavior with events and must construct a system to achieve functional relations that lead to laws; in this way, prediction and control become effective. Language permit contact with actual things through analogies and similarities by verbal or graphic behavior.
1966 TO 1981 (2)	To use the set of ITB postulates to study interactions of multi-variables and compare theories. To improve prediction and control through more factors that can be explained, without intervening variables. To refine constructions based on research and systematize findings. Apply historiocritical analysis of psychology.
1982 TO 1997 (2)	We can also know through mediation substitutive functions and observational inference. Based on Knator, from Bijou (1984) we can conclude that one objective of knowledge in ITB psychology is to identify fundamental assumptions not offered a priori; to understand development by cross-sectional and longitudinal studies. Science = behavior in culture, inseparable from behavior of scientists who develop methodology to generate data.
UP TO 1950 (3)	The notion of causation can not be <i>abstractionistic</i> and <i>absolutistic</i> implying and inevitable temporal relation between factors. New theory of causation contributes to improve knowledge. Psychology events need not be reduced to events of other sciences. They consist of R and S functions, with primary factors (history, setting and medium or contact) (Kantor, 1938, 1942). All participate in a particular causal field: Cause is a type of correlation. There are interbehavioral levels that evolve (time) and are more complex than others (1942).
1951 TO 1965 (3)	Causation signifies interrelation of factors en an event complex. Need to observe the kind of properties of events, their activities and the oprations upon them. Reject psychic powers upon biological O. Causation is comprised of all field factor: no factor operates as an independent cause.
1966 TO	The complex interrelational structure of the factors of interbehavioral fields is sufficient for explana tion. No part of O (neural, glandular) determines activities of the O as a whole. There is no

1981 (3)	Double world: events occur only in a spatiotemporal frame. Psychological events depend upon a preceding history called "reactional biography"
1982 TO 1998 (3)	The same concept of causation: psychological events resides not in the O but in their relationship. The <del>XXXXX</del> a self-regulatory system. Causality is qualitative and quantitative interdependencies in a event field, be it molecular or molar. Difference between immediate and distant "causes" refers only to moments identified in the event field.
UP TO 1950 (4)	<p>Distinction between scientific and common concepts "marks a difference in the levels of our behavior" (mere implicit contact with things to a deliberated manipulation and understanding of objects for certain purpose). "Scientific concepts operates in a more remote way upon objects than do the everyday concepts. From the fact that scientific concepts are practically identical with ideas, we may infer that difference In degree between concepts parallels such cristalization of reactions as to make them available as stimuli to actions." (Kantor, 1921, in Kantor, 1971, pg. 155). A concept is an object of scientific technique – it is embodied in language, wich is a tool for operation and expression of <i>thinking</i>. In 1922, Kantor proposed to retain or develop only a logic and methodology of science for psychology. As a natural science, psychology must leave up metaphysical obstacles (dualism, reductionism) and use only hypothesis and assumptions to methods and interpretation of fundamental data (Kantor, 1922). In his article about operational principles in psychology, Kantor concludes that scientific operationism is a special case of interbehavior helpful to eliminate dualism, operational principle include observational procedures and formulation of postulates. Ideological basis of scientific knowledge must be derived from interactions with events rather than from cultural formulae (Kantor, 1938b). Valid knowledge depends on concrete operations under the control of the investigator. Scientific work is interbehavior with events or constructions (symbols, propositions). Science develops through self-correction (1938a,1939). Is psychology, valid inductions are derived from observations of "coincident components" in interbehavioral situations (Kantor, 1942).</p> <p>Scientific success: a function of the way how scientist approach his field of operation (observation, manipulation and inference) constructions – propositions and laws. Scientific trends proposed are illustrated by relativity theory, Quantum mechanics, indeterminacy principle and Kant-Bridgman discrimination agains meaningless questions.</p>

	Example. For Kantor, principle of psychological continuity is central and is illustrated by the interbehavioral ranges, which can be studied diachronically (through time succession), or synchronically (at the moment occurrence). Based on this principle, knowing behavior and more complicated interbehavioral processes are pyramid into the evolution of learning and individual differences.
1966 TO 1981 (1)	Essence of field construction: displace concepts in terms of principles and properties localized <i>within the observed</i> or <i>in an external condition</i> . Valid knowledge is derived from direct observation of objects, events and their specific conditions. Knowledge is relative. Concept of cross-sectional stages in knowledge of ontogenesis.
1982 TO 1988 (1)	Knowledge is progressive through exploratory behavior and learning – interactional history. Constructional or knowledge reality concerns only valid description or formulas based on criteria as adequacy and usefulness. Psychological events are continuous with other kinds of interbehavior. Concepts are interbehavioral field.
UP TO 1950 (2)	In 1922, Kantor classified scientific facts in three types and specified that the psychological type was psychologists subject matter, he included behavior but the one classed under a type different from the behavior studied by physicist and biologists. He was clear in that the kind of knowledge is dependent upon how data are interpreted. We know by observing the objects in S- R interactions. Subject matter: Interbehavior of O with other O and objects under specific conditions. After observing, we describe. Descriptions depend upon instruments and operations used (1938b). Unit of psychological description: behavior segment. Aim: throw off animistic traditions, and describe psychological events as interbehavior of organism in a field of actions, in mutual psychological situations along evolution (history); previous events and specific present circumstances condition all psychological interbehavior: <i>mentally or personality equipment</i> (1937). Descriptions are not identical with the things described (Kantor, 1938a).
1951 TO 1965 (2)	In 1959 Kantor published his book <i>interbehavioral psychology</i> , where he shows that psychology was still confounding its essential data with correlates and occult processes because of dualistic constructions, so he presents a model of a formal logical system to complement his previous work on psychology as a natural science. Psychological constructions (knowledge) must be derived from observation, describing and experiment. Objective: to identify behavioral functions: factor in perceiving, learning, thinking; relative effects of prior and present conditions; influence of central and peripheral factors in psychological events. Any factor can be isolated for research purpose, but

## KANTOR – INTERBEHAVIORISM

<p>UP TO 1950 (1)</p>	<p>In 1921, Kantor wrote about the problem of meaning for psychology and related it with knowledge. For him. Meaning reaction or meaning response is an act, is part of our actions (patterns), are specific differential R to particular appropriate settings. It operates as evaluatory response and serves to mediate final adaptation to objects. The autor also relates this concept to the ability of foreseeing consequences of an act and to have delayed reactions; also to consciousness, but <b>to know</b> implies to be able “to report to himself verbally or otherwise that such an event has taken place” (Kantor, 1921, in Kantor 1971, pg. 147). In 1922, he defined the difference between a physical event and a psychological one in that the latter involves <b>knowing</b>: the person react to a stimulus but he/she may know he is doing so; but he also accepts that there are responses or stimulus that can be unknown to the person, so, it is important to recognize when <b>knowing</b> is essential in a psychological reaction. But as a psychological event, <b>knowing</b> is the action of a person and is a natural event (Kantor, 1922). Knowing is a class of interbehavior that include operations of the individual with immediate or absent object and is influenced by social conventionalities; such operations do not involve psychic factor, are natural. Knowing must be distinguished from linguistic and symbolic interbehaviors; the operations involved are very different (1938a). knowledge changes with contact with phenomena. Scientific knowledge is qualitatively different from cultural knowledge and is conditioned by particular technique employed and by culture (Kantor, 1938)</p>
<p>1951 TO 1965 (1)</p>	<p>In his book of 1959, Kantor reiterated his view that “knowing behavior belongs to the same spatiotemporal framework as the things eliciting the knowing action” (pp.25.). knowing is discriminating behavior belonging to the naturalistic framework of the known. Thinking and its products are not invariant or metaphysical processes. It is necessary to construct systems, but based upon direct observation of objects and events; we can have a logic or interrelated sentences, numbers and relations of behavior, qualities or quantities, but we must know the system constructor behavior and his history. In psychology. We know about psychological events or psychological activities and they are related to interbehavioral history (prior contacts with objects and social factors); psychological action implies a specific interaction with a <i>stimulus function of an object</i> (this interactional event is what we call “person´s mind”, pp. 48). Through evolution, psychological interbehavior present variations and complexities that accumulate, language is one.</p>

## STADDON – THEORETICAL BEHAVIORISM

1996 TO 1981	From the late 60's and the 70's Staddon worked on responding under a cyclic – interval schedules, spaced responding and choice, operant inhibition and generalization gradients, in function of attention and temporal discrimination, informative feedback sensory inhibition contrast and reinforcement omission. Behavior as adaptation to constraint.
1982 TO 1997 (1)	Evolutionary continuity principle. Animal and human modes of knowledge have evolved under natural selection rules. Faith in logic and reason. We know about real world. Subject (scientist) and object are different. Operant behavior as every behavior determined by consequences, being learned or not. Truth is relative.
1966 TO 1981 (2)	To classify behavior in terms of its dependence upon context (past history) describing larger generality mechanisms in cause – effect relations. Uses "epigenesis"
1982 TO 1997 (2)	To discover lawful regularities and invariant in behavior through experimentation and explanation in terms of a process – feedback model = control – system account useful to quantitative predictions.
1966 TO 1981 (3)	To assign a causal function to the immediately precedent event may be adaptive. Explanations in terms of mechanisms that mediate behavior and consequences. Mechanisms may range from simple linear model to a complex computer circuits to complex neurochemical processes. Explanations in final terms are incomplete.
1982 TO 1998 (3)	<i>History</i> and <i>state</i> as notions to complement explanation in terms of mechanisms. Ecological niche enters in causal explanation and defines adaptive patterns to survival. Behavior is determined by nervous system physical activity including mental activity.
1982 TO 1998 (4)	Psychology is a science that differs from physical sciences in quantitative terms. The same for scientific knowledge v.s. intelligent computer. Levels of scientific explanations: each of it has its uses.

<b>TELEOLOGICAL BEHAVIORISM</b>	
	Was proposed in 1985. data presented before correspond to Rachlin's works
1966 TO 1981 (1)	In the late 60's he work on emotional effects of punishment and auto-shaping. In the 70's: works with concurrent schedules, define the feedback function as molar and temporal aspects on behavior in humans: studies on choice and self – control.
1982 TO 1998 (1)	Characteristic of human specie: holism. Data are in external environ. Behavior pattern – defined by regularity and permanence in time. Mental terms as patterns of public behavior organized in terms of final and efficient causes. No difference between overt and verbal behavior in their relations to environment. Economics: a science of final causes.
1966 TO 1981 (2)	Time rather than R rate is appropriate measure of independent variable and dependent variable. From Tolman: molar explanation. Experimental analysis of behavior as methodology, specially concurrent schedules
1982 TO 1997 (29)	To explain final causes of behavior. It is possible through scientific method – molar analysis. Teleological act is understood through probability = relative frequencies of events themselves. Method: 1- direct observation under a set of constraints, 2- inference of utility functions based on maximization, 3- prediction in new setting, 4- analysis of deviation between predicted and actual behavior
1966 TO 1981 (3) 1982 TO 1997 (3)	Behavior as determined by maximization value. Matching and utility maximization both necessitate conformity to the matching law and reflect the fundamental conception of choice. Probability concept as IV in choice behavior  From Aristotle: final cause as a larger pattern into which events fit and relate to one another abstractly conceived. The context (final cause) of an act extends into the future as well as into the past. Utility functions are final causes. Final causes vary I degree : the lowest is the action of a goal – end on an instrumental act.
1982 TO 1998 (4)	Validity criteria: success to solve humanity problems (education, delinquency, mental health). Science must be analyzed as a whole in its interaction with environment. Psychology as a science must follow strict scientific methodology of experimental analysis of behavior.



**B. F. SKINNER – CONDUCTISMO RADICAL <sup>1</sup>**  
**1. QUE ES EL CONOCIMIENTO – QUE SE CONOCE (desde la psicología)**

<p>HASTA 1950</p> <p>DE 1951 A 1965</p>	<p>El conocimiento implica una conducta de discriminación. Es una herramienta en la adaptación del individuo al mundo. El conocimiento opera a través de la acción y la experiencia directa. El conocimiento es un producto histórico, con sus raíces en la evolución y la cultura.</p> <p>Se pueden conocer hechos y dentro de ellos, la conducta del organismo como un “todo”, conocer la conducta como interacción entre el organismo y las variables ambientales en términos de relaciones funcionales o relaciones de contingencia. Además podemos conocer nuestros eventos privados (condiciones del cuerpo) e informar o dar reportes sobre ellos, con base en los procesos verbales. (Skinner, 1945 y 1947)</p> <p>Skinner mantiene el principio de continuidad entre las especies animales: tanto los animales inferiores como los humanos forman conceptos de la misma manera. Los principios de interpretación tienen que ver con el uso de principios teóricos a partir de hechos científicos, con el fin de entender “por qué” nos comportamos como lo hacemos. Así como se conocen hechos de la naturaleza y el mundo social, se puede conocer uno mismo: auto-conocimiento, pero éste es un producto social, así como el reporte acerca de eventos privado, depende de contingencias sociales. El científico y la ciencia que produce también son productos de la cultura. El organismo puede conocerse como un sistema de conducta que depende de las relaciones funcionales con eventos o condiciones externas (Skinner, 1953). En su obra de 1957 (<i>Conducta verbal</i>) define que la característica crítica del pensamiento no está atada con la distinción entre verbal y no verbal o entre público y privado.</p>
<p>DE 1966 A 1981</p>	<p>Reafirma que el conocimiento es una forma especial de conducta porque implica relaciones con el ambiente (se hace efectivo al actuar). Significa que podemos comportarnos de acuerdo con la conducta verbal apropiada.</p> <p>El conocimiento científico tiene el mismo estatus que otro tipo de conocimiento. Le da importancia a la observación inmediata en el conocimiento. El conocimiento sobre lo ético o moral y la conducta ética es producto de la evolución social: las contingencias sociales se refieren a que nuestro comportamiento social en gran parte está determinado por los efectos en los demás (preguntan sobre él), (Skinner, 1974)</p> <p>Los contenidos conscientes son parte del comportamiento – actuamos en referencia a ellos.</p>
<p>DE 1982</p>	<p>Pensar es hacer algo que hace posible otro comportamiento, como en el caso de la solución de problemas. Reafirma su filosofía empírica.</p> <p>El conocimiento científico es un producto de la evolución del comportamiento del científico al interactuar con los objetos y los</p>

<sup>1</sup> Este trabajo es parte de un Poster presentado por Blanca P Ballesteros de Valderrama y Amanda Rey en la 24 Convención Anual de la Association for Behavior Analysis en Mayo de 1998 Orlando, Florida. Esta año hará parte de un simposio sobre epistemología de los conductismos en la 25 Convención (Chicago, Mayo 26-30, 1999). Traducido del Inglés.

eventos
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**B. F. SKINNER – CONDUCTISMO RADICAL**  
**2. COMO SE CONOCE Y EL PARA QUE DEL CONOCIMIENTO**

HASTA 1950	<p>En 1931, Skinner enafatizó la importancia de permanecer “al nivel de nuestras observaciones” en cuanto su perspectiva científica (Skinner, 1931). De Loeb tomó su interés por estudiar el organismo como un todo. El objetivo de la psicología como ciencia de la conducta: predecir y controlar el comportamiento sin necesidad del mentalismo. Desarrollar un sistema explicatorio explícitamente “relacional”</p> <p>Define que su interés es el comportamiento operante y que la tasa o frecuencia de emisión de las respuestas es el método adecuado para el análisis del comportamiento, como medida principal de la fuerza de una operante (1938).</p> <p>Objetivos del conocimiento del científico del comportamiento: Describir regularidades entre variables dependientes (el comportamiento) y variables independientes; construir una teoría del comportamiento (entendido como acción del organismo del mundo). “en un marco de referencia proporcionado por el organismo mismo” (Skinner, 1947).</p> <p>En 1950 aclara que una ciencia del comportamiento busca evaluar la probabilidad de la respuesta y explorar las condiciones que la determinan. La tasa de respuesta no es lo mismo que la probabilidad, pero es el “único dato sensible a las condiciones relevantes al proceso de aprendizaje” (Skinner, 1950, p. 75)</p>
DE 1951 A 1965	<p>Reafirma que el objetivo de la psicología es estudiar el comportamiento como objeto científico (un objeto complejo porque es un proceso). Igualmente el objetivo es construir una red de trabajo lingüístico acerca de conceptos conductuales relacionados. Se tienen que buscar la funcionalidad de los términos y los conceptos, no solamente lo que ellos significan en su forma prescriptiva. Reafirma la busca de acción efectiva, no la verdad del conocimiento. Importancia de sustituir las teorías que bloquean el uso de métodos científicos en el estudio de los asuntos humanos.</p>
DE 1966 A 1981	<p>En 1966, Skinner diferencia aun más entre probabilidad de respuesta y tasa de respuesta; acepta la tasa como un paso en la dirección de evaluar la probabilidad con el fin de predecir y controlar el comportamiento. Diez años después lamenta el uso poco frecuente de los registros acumulativos en los estudios y experimentos porque el control del comportamiento es más posible cuando conocemos los cambios “moleculares”, momento a momento, por su relevancia en nuestra vida cotidiana. De esa forma, el diseño de contingencias sería más fácil (Skinner, 1976)</p> <p>El objetivo de la actividad científica es servir a la supervivencia del ser humano, controlar los comportamientos con consecuencias peligrosas a largo plazo o remotas, describir relaciones funcionales que permitan hacer predicciones apropiadas (Skinner, 1966)</p>
DE 1982 A 1998	<p>Reafirma el objetivo de descubrir todas las variables relacionadas con la probabilidad de “acción”. Buscar la forma más efectiva de tratar con el comportamiento para buscar una forma de vida que permita la felicidad, no solo de las generaciones presentes sino de las futuras (Skinner, 1988)</p>

**B. F. SKINNER – CONDUCTISMO RADICAL**  
**3. ACERCA DE LA CAUSALIDAD – EXPLICACIÓN DEL COMPORTAMIENTO**

HASTA 1950	<p>En la década de los 30, Skinner toma de Mach la concepción de causación, la cual es sustituida por el concepto de explicación. Las relaciones funcionales son relaciones causales.</p> <p>Los eventos privados son productos colaterales que a su vez deben explicarse – no causan el comportamiento.</p>
DE 1951 A 1965	<p>Las relaciones causales implican relaciones entre “cambios en la variable independiente” y “cambios en la variable dependiente”. El comportamiento se puede explicar a través de variables independientes externas, sin embargo, estas pueden ser muy sutiles y complejas y se encuentran en el ambiente inmediato y en la historia (filogenética y ontogenética) (1953)</p> <p>Concepto de causalidad “consecuencial” = la selección por consecuencias como primer modo causal por el cuando el ambiente determina el comportamiento. El comportamiento “propositivo” ocurre a través de esta modalidad de selección. Las contingencias de refuerzo seleccionan formas de comportamiento variadas y novedosas (1953)</p> <p>Los eventos privados entran en las relaciones funcionales para explicar el comportamiento.</p>
DE 1966 A 1981	<p>Aclara que las causas eficientes (iniciales) están en el ambiente, pero su concepción de causalidad no es mecánica. Las explicaciones en términos de eventos privados dejan incompleta la cadena causal porque debe explicarse ese “evento interno” (1972)</p> <p>Explica la causalidad “consecuencial” en cuanto a su aplicación al comportamiento filogenético y ontogenético. Plantea tres niveles de selección por consecuencias la filogenética, la ontogenética y la cultura (1981)</p>
DE 1982 A 1998	<p>Énfasis en el concepto de comportamiento de control (controlador) – las reglas generadas por uno mismo forman parte de las relaciones funcionales (causales)</p> <p>Reafirma y hace mayor énfasis en la selección por consecuencias (contingencias de supervivencia, de refuerzo y sociales) como modo casual.</p>

**C. F. SKINNER – CONDUCTISMO RADICAL**  
**4. CRITERIOS DE VALIDEZ – CIENCIA**

HASTA 1950	<p>De Bacon y Mach, Skinner toma su concepción científica y el método histórico. Una descripción científica del comportamiento consiste en describir el hecho conductual en sus relaciones con otros hechos – eso es explicar.</p> <p>Entonces, explicar es establecer relaciones funcionales. De Crozier toma el método del caso individual – caso único.</p> <p>En 1947 establece como teoría apropiada aquella capaz de representar la multiplicidad de sistemas de respuesta sin acudir al concepto de individuo como originador de la acción. La productividad científica está dada por la acción sobre los problemas: ese es el objeto de una ciencia del comportamiento.</p> <p>Una teoría válida = la que describe los datos de forma económica pero “comprensible” (implica permanecer al mismo nivel de observación y las mismas dimensiones de medida).</p> <p>La recolección de datos que muestra relaciones uniformes es necesaria, pero también la representación formal de los datos reducida a un mínimo número de términos (teoría válida) (1950).</p> <p>Rechaza el dogma metafísico, el operacionalismo y la verdad por consenso o acuerdo (Skinner, 1945)</p>
DE 1951 A 1965	<p>En la exploración y explicación científica no son adecuadas las explicaciones esencialistas.</p> <p>Los principios teóricos se utilizan para interpretar y comprender observaciones empíricas novedosas. Una teoría conductual válida debe permitir el tipo de control que lleve a acciones acerca de los problemas del mundo.</p> <p>En 1963 aclara que no es válida la distinción entre eventos psicológicos públicos y privados como si tuvieran naturaleza o estatus diferente, ambos tienen las mismas dimensiones físicas.</p>
DE 1966 A 1981	<p>La explicación válida es la que permite predicción y control (1972). Cuando no se llega al control, es una interpretación (pero de eventos de la misma clase de aquellos que permiten control).</p> <p>Las explicaciones estructuralistas no son necesarias, tampoco el reduccionismo (1961).</p> <p>El comportamiento científico está bajo el control inmediato de aspectos relevantes del ambiente científico.</p> <p>Reafirma que el humanismo de la ciencia y de la tecnología no está en su naturaleza o su origen, sino en su aplicación (su utilización)</p> <p>La “verdad” de una proposición está determinada por la extensión en la cual ayude a responder de forma efectiva a la situación que describe (1974)</p>
DE 1982 A 1998	<p>Vuelve a enfatizar los criterios para evaluar una teoría científica: el apoyo empírico, el apoyo lógico, la generalidad, la parsimonia y la utilidad para la solución de problemas de la humanidad.</p> <p>Los avances en las ciencias biológicas, la fisiología y neurología complementarán explicaciones de la psicología, pero posiblemente no las reemplazarán.</p>

